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The famous Chancellor of England who wrote of Utopia, the
ideal commonwealth, has this to say of its people: "Yet this thing
they chiefly reprove among other nations that innumerable books
of law and expositions upon the same be not sufficient. But they
think it against all right and justice that men should be bound to
those laws, which either be in number more than be able to be
read, or else blinder and darker than that any man can well
understand them. . . . Else as touching the vulgar sort of
the people which be both most in number and have most need
to know their duties, were it not as good for them that no law
were made at all, as when it is made to bring so blind an inter-
pretation upon it that without great wit and long arguing no
man can discern it."1
It is a far cry from an ideal commonwealth, either to our own
or any that we expect. Yet these words of one of the greatest
lawyers of England, written exactly four hundred years ago, are
perhaps more interesting to our generation than they were to his.
If one should go into court when the judge was pronouncing
his decision, he might find him expounding the principles that
"equity delights to do justice and not by halves," and that "equity
regards the substance rather than the form." He would be well
pleased at such just sentiments.
If he goes now into the next room, he may hear another judge
pronouncing judgment and expressly excluding these principles.
He may that evening go into his library and, opening Hume,
come upon his discussion of the English Court of High Com-
mission. He will find him saying that the cause of the great
feeling against it was its procedure, which was wholly opposed
to principles of "justice and equity." Now, if a lawyer should
come in upon him, he might point out that "justice" and "equity"
were not at all the same things, that if the historian used the
words as synonymous, he wrote, indeed, as an ordinary man
would write but with great inaccuracy. The mystery is now
complete.
By "justice," he has in his mind civil justice, that which accord-
ing to a famous definition consists in "giving to every man his
due"; he is taxed for the machinery which is supposed to pro-
1Utopia, 163.
A GLANCE AT EQUITY
duce it; he believes he can appeal to it if in need; yet he has
only a vague idea, if any, of what it is. The court is to him a
sort of mysterious accouchment chamber where this justice, after
vast labor pains of delay and ceremony and dispute, at last comes
into being.
If he inquires he finds that this justice is not the same thing
as equity, it is not the same thing as law, it is not the law of con-
science, it is not the law of reason, nor of nature, nor of nations,
it is not custom, it is not the law of God.
When Mary was told that by English law, her husband,
William of Orange, would be excluded from all participation in
her sovereignty, she said to him: "I did not know until yesterday
that there was so great a difference between the law of England
and the law of God."
What then shall we say to one who makes inquiry? Is it so
that after a matter of two thousand years of western civilization,
we have not developed a system for administering justice that is
comprehended by the common man, scarcely even by the educated
man? In a very large degree we must, indeed, say that it is true.
We can only say that while justice is not any one of these
things alone, it may perhaps be anyone of them in a given case;
that broadly speaking, it is a compound of all of them together.
We shall be obliged to admit that the most learned men are con-
stantly quarreling and disagreeing about it. If one believes that
law is justice or ought to be, we shall have to say that law is
something which lawyers, professors and philosophers cannot
agree in defining.
Blackstone's definition of law, according to the idea of Ben-
tham, no one now considers as more than a statement of one of
its aspects. The late James C. Carter2 makes a prolonged and
serious effort to define law. He excludes one definition after
another, even that exceedingly clear one that it is "That ordering
of the affairs of men which is upheld by the popular will," and
finally evolving his own definition, he says merely that: "Law
is custom." To that definition, making it the beginning and end
of the matter, he absolutely adheres.
But this definifion really goes no more than half way. If law
is custom, upon what does custom rest? It must rest upon some
concept. It cannot be true that custom is something that just
happens.
'In a very recent book, "Law, Its Origin, Growth and Development."
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We must end then, by telling our inquirer that we cannot
resolve his difficulty by precise definition. We must admit
frankly that in none of the activities of man has his progress
been so laborious and slow as in the development of his notions
of adequate civil justice and of methods to carry them into
effect. But we can say that, tho' now slumbering and now
grievously retarded, this development has been a progression
toward a system of civil justice that tends all the time to become
more simple and intelligible and to reach to higher ethical
concepts.
- In all this long-history of development there is no more signi-
ficant thing in modem times, than the English Judicature Act
and the abolition it carried of all distinction in form between law
and equity. And the next great step must be in the future, the
absolute wiping out of all distinction between law and equity in
name and principle as well as in form and procedure. The time
will surely come when there will be no such thing as the vast
anomaly of this distinction as it has existed and in great part
exists now. It will take generations to accomplish it, the amend-
ing in some respects of constitutions, before they can be, as they
in fact ought to be, one and the same thing; but that it will come
is as certain as that we have emerged from compurgation and
trial by battle or from the extreme temper of reaction which held
fast to rules shockingly unjust, based upon feudal theories and
necessities, the reason for which had long since passed away.
With this fulfillment, it is certain that our system of jurispru-
dence must approach immeasurably nearer its ideal of a rational,
effective and harmonious whole.
Only that prophecy can be of interest that is based upon the
past. To look forward we must look back. It may not be an
exaggeration to say that the development of equitable jurispru-
dence is the most significant thing in all our judicial history.
For it discloses in a manner far more impressive than the growth
of the common law, the onward, persistent march toward a system
of real justice, "complete and not by halves," a march that keeps
pace with the growth of enlightened opinion and higher moral
standards.
It is a strange picture that unfolds as we look back. We see
a system that l~as existed in no other land than England, among
no other peoples, a system administering different principles, not
as in the Roman law, in the same tribunal, but in separate and
distinct ones. We see the law courts contesting vigorously the
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growth of the equitable jurisdiction, the judges resisting all inno-
vation, insistent upon precedent, attempting to thwart and impede
the action of the Chancery and the King. There pass before us
the varying fortunes of the civil law, now held in high esteem,
now so contemned that its Professor is forbidden to teach it in
Oxford. We see the early Chancellors, Churchmen all of them,
not lawyers, adopting sometime precepts of the Roman law in the
exercise of their extraordinary jurisdiction; the law judges under
Richard II forbade it to be quoted in their courts. We see
the judges fomenting agitation in the commons against the
Chancery and the commons bitterly complaining to the King.
The judges charge the Chancellor with attempts to subvert the
whole law of England, with the practice of substituting conscience
for definite rule. They thwart the great Statute of Edward III
providing for writs in similar cases to be issued out of the
Chancery in all respects like the ones of ancient precedent. By
claiming and exercising the right to decide upon the validity of
these new writs when issued, they emasculated a statute which
might have led to such a development of the common law that
Chancery would have ceased to exist-they argued and intrigued,
they spun out refinement upon refinement.
In the reign of Edward IV in 1483, the Chancellor issued an
injunction to restrain the plaintiff from proceeding to judgment
after verdict, in the Court of Kings Bench. But the Chief Justice
said that they would not suffer it, that none the less the plaintiff
might proceed. They would give him judgment and if he were
imprisoned in the Fleet for violation of the injunction, they would
grant a habeas corpus and discharge him.
Before many years were to pass, Wolsey as Chancellor of
England was to find his use of the injunction constituting one of
the articles of impeachment against him.
Nearly a hundred and fifty years afterward, the contest breaks
out into what now is to be an issue of supreme historical impor-
tance, in which are set against each other two of the great lawyers
of all time, Coke and Bacon. To their difference of opinion was
added personal feeling in a high degree. The jealousy of Coke
at Bacon's rise and power could scarcely work otherwise than to
accentuate the spirit of opposition, the temper of defiance, with
which all his life he had looked upon the encroaching jurisdic-
tion of the Chancellor. One who held the common law through-
out his career in supreme veneration, who called it indeed, "the
perfection of reason," would be inclined to exert every power in
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him to resist the doctrine put forward, that the Chancellor might
enjoin the enforcement of a judgment at law. The doctrine must
have seemed no less hateful to the judges as an assault upon the
dignity and authority of the whole common law system than as
the exercise of a power under a principle which, if expanded,
might result in its entire overthrow. The case was referred to
the law officers who, under the leadership of Bacon, sustained the
Chancellor and he in turn was upheld by the King.
James I indeed had little inclination to act otherwise. He
was no friend of the law courts, and found early occasion to
rebuke the judges, summoning them before him and saying "that
of late the courts of common law are grown so vast and trans-
cendant as they did both meddle with the king's prerogative and
had encroached upon all other courts of justice."3
The charges were not all on one side. But scarcely could the
King act otherwise than in defence of his Chancellor, for in
doing so he was defending his own authority.
The jurisdiction was settled, never again to be successfully
challenged, and with the decision of the controversy it is some-
times said that the contest between the two jurisdictions came
to end.
But this cannot be said to be true. The permanency of equity,
its place, its function as a system, vital, potential, with large
powers of growth, was indeed finally assured. There were to
continue as there had been in the past two kinds of jurisprudence,
proceeding upon different principles, in different tribunals, with
far different methods. But what perhaps gave stability to this
distinction and may have contributed more largely than anything
in the past to the development of the equitable jurisdiction, was
the practice now beginning of reporting the decisions of the
Chancery Court.
From this time there must have seemed a greater likelihood
than ever before of deference to precedent, the development and
establishing of fixed and settled rules, out of the absence of which
complaints of suitors and many of the assaults of the judges and
lawyers had sprung.
And now begins, in definite form, the development of what
seems to be a supreme paradox. Equity found Justice a prisoner
in the camp of Precedent and it set her free. It found only one
door into the temple, which Customs alone could enter and it
opened another portal beside it.
'Hallam, Eng. Const., i99.
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Born in protest of precedent, proceeding in defiance of it, it
now embraces it. It comes back to the house it had left. It
adopts what seemed to be the rude ceremonies and unholy minis-
trations of the ritual from which it had fled. Precedent becomes
its guide. Its rules are definitely formulated, its body of princi-
ples defined and settled until we find Sir Frederick Pollock
observing ten years ago: "So completely has it forgotten its old
claim to administer natural justice that a judge of the Chancery
Division in England can now say 'this court is not a court of
conscience'."
In periods almost exactly equal in time, about three hundred
years from Edward II, when the Year Books began, until James
I, and a like period from James I until the present time, the
common law and the law of the Chancellor's Court had become
as lex scripta, identical in character.
Here, then, is the picture of the age-long struggle, the struggle
of two unlike forces to develop in harmony with each other;
the effort at combination of elements which, out of their very
nature it seems, must resist assimilation, the effort to fuse, out
of absolute necessity, the authority of precedent, so that not
only should there be law but that it should be known, and the
more complete, the higher justice which the particulars of the
case and the circumstances of the time seem to demand.
"The Court," said the Judge of the Chancery Division, "is
not a court of conscience." But that, too, goes back two hundred
years.
It had become so necessary for equity to attempt to free itself
from the charge of arbitrary decisions that as early as 1676,
Lord Nottingham, the Chancellor, sometimes called "The father
of equity" on account of his great exposition and development
of its principles, pointed out4 that the court did not proceed
according to conscience "naturalis et interna" but by conscience
"civilis et politica." Whatever effect this distinction was to have
in the future the fact is that in the beginning and for long before
that time it had been quite otherwise. It is plain that there has
been much confusion about it in the minds of the various writers.
Spence, writing of the reign of James I, says: "But generally
during this reign as well as before, equity and conscience as rules
of decision were referred to principles deducible from the Roman
jurisprudence, the sanction of which was occasionally directly
'Cook v. Fountain, 3 Swanst 6oo.
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adverted to independently of the private conscience of the judge.
Nothing is recorded as having been delivered judicially from
the bench which can warrant the supposition that the private
opinion or conscience of the judge, or what is perhaps equivalent,
his whim or caprice, independent of principle and precedent, was
a legitimate ground of decision."
'
If by this is meant that Equity developed upon a regard for
precedent originally, or entirely upon the basis of the Roman
law, the statement cannot be true and is refuted by his former
statement that the Chancellors "took for their guide the principles
of general jurisprudence and looked only to the attainment of
what they considered to be substantial justice.""
"Equity," says Holland, "springs from old rules becoming too
narrow, or out of harmony with advancing civilization, hence
the introduction of some high functionary of a more perfect
body of rules discoverable in his judicial conscience."1
7
The history of Equity discloses a long course of criticism and
defiance, proceeding on the one side from the judges, on the other
from the Chancellor and the supporters of his jurisdiction. It
is said that the Chancery unsettles the law and for long in the
beginning it certainly did so. The great Selden makes his historic
scoff at equity as "a roguish thing", "according to the Chancellor's
conscience." "It is all one," he said, "as if they should make the
standard of measure the Chancellor's foot, according as it is
long or short, so is equity." And Selden was a contemporary of
Lord Nottingham and spoke toward the end of the century in
the beginning of which, it has been said, the contest between
law and equity practically ended.
Thereby, it would seem, plainly appears the continual feeling
of distrust, jealousy and opposition, that lasted for generations.
Indeed, great lawyers, a vast body of students and followers,
bred to absolute veneration of the common law, could find only
in it, as in great measure it was, the bulwark of English freedom
and instrument of social development, the exposition of the
national temper and spirit, reaching ever to higher levels and a
more perfect standard of excellence.
In Blackstone's mind the common law spoke with as much
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Writing his treatise in 1765 in volumes comprising more than
a thousand pages, he finds room only for a scant eight pages for
a discussion of equity.
Sir Frederick Pollock, a great champion of the common law,
remarks that at the time when Blackstone wrote, modem equity
was in its infancy, yet only just thirty years later we find Swift
saying of the Chancellor's Court: "It is sufficient to remark that
it has directly or indirectly claimed cognizance of almost every
other matter that respects property, so as to become the most
important tribunal in England." 8
There can be no better illustration than Blackstone of the
temper and attitude of the great common law magistrates. He
is above all a champion and defender of the common law. But
another, with a sense of humor at least not profound, is able
to say of equity that it is "the most magnificent and practically
useful monument that man has ever in any country raised in his
character of a jurisprudential animal.""
Blackstone insists that the common law enforces the principles
of equity in its own judgments. He goes so far as to be unwilling
to admit even the defects which equity has supplied. "It is said
that it is the business of the court of equity in England to abate
the rigor of the common law. But no such power is contended
for."'1 0 A statement so surprising invites examination.
As early as 1349, under Edward II, the Chancellor was hold-
ing court alone. Under Richard II, we find the Chancery
certainly established as a separate court with a difference in
procedure settled on forms substantially characterizing those of
modem times. Under Edward IV, its jurisdiction for some
purposes had been so far conceded that we find "all the judges
affirming that the Chancery was the King's court." It had
already assumed a large jurisdiction. But it was precisely in
those cases in which the court assumed to act in contradiction
to that of the law courts and in remedy of their defects that we
find the judges quarreling and protesting. And from this time
on, when the court had become under Edward IV set up as a
separate court, "the judges continued to dispute the Chancellor's
authority to interfere with the jurisdiction of the common law
courts."'"
'Swift's Digest, Vol. II.
'London Jurist, July, 1846.
"0Comm., Vol. 2, page 419.
"Spence on Equity, i, page 349.
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Nearly three hundred years before Blackstone makes this state-
ment that it was not contended that it was the function of equity
to abate the rigor of the common law, Bacon had said in his
History of Henry VII that under his Parliament, 1487, among
"divers excellent laws ordained" and among the courts there
were "the Chancery, the Pretorian power for mitigating the rigor
of the common law in case of extremity by the conscience of a
good man." So also Lambard, who writes in the time of Eliza-
beth, says of the rise of equity: "The king did commit to his
Chancellor together with the charge of the great seal his own
regal, absolute and extraordinary pre-eminence of jurisdiction in
civil causes as well for the amendment as for the supply of the
common law."
It is sometimes said that the development of English equity
jurisprudence is an accident. Bispham in his sketch of its origin
speaks of it so, and Swift says that "a court by mere accident
grew out of the necessity of the existing state of things and by
degrees assumed and established a jurisdiction of great extent
and importance." 12
This, perhaps, is true and not true. The form may have been
accidental but the rise of equity can no more be said to be an
accident than the whole progress of civilization can be said to
be one.
The error of those who see equity rising only from a mere
custom, that of appeal to the parental authority of the king and
the granting of special relief upon such petition by him, or by
him and his council as a matter of course, is pointed out by Sir
Henry Maine in his work on "Ancient Law." The growth of
equity, as also in similar if more laborious and tardy manner of
law, is the growth of moral progress.
The history of equity makes plain its progress from conscience
to precedent, as before pointed out, and shows how at last it
crystallizes in a system which may again fail to keep pace with
the expansion of ideas of adequate justice. There can be, indeed,
no effective precedent without permanency of record and for five
hundred years equity developed without any such thing. It was
in the beginning a system which did, in fact, proceed without
settled rules except so far as it sometimes applied the principles
of the civil law, and Blackstone points out that in early times,
its decisions were, more than anything else, in the nature of
awards.
'Vol. 2, page 14.
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The first grant of awards by the king and his council in the
exercise of a jurisdiction out of which equity has grown was not
in cases where the common law could not furnish a remedy but
where from the violence of the times and the power of suitors,
the courts were powerless to act, the whole ordinary machinery
of justice broken down.
The poor indeed were almost out of the pale of the protection
of the law. The Commons in the reign of Richard II complain
of the oppression of the king's courts as so great that justice
could not be done. And this, with varying changes of light and
shade, is a picture that continues for hundreds of years of English
history, amid the recurring convulsions of society and the fluctua-
tions of freedom and security. The helplessness of the ordinary
courts under Henry I which caused the first petition to the king
is strikingly before us at the close of the Fifteenth Century.
Green draws a vivid picture of social England during that time.
The Paston letters "lift for us," he says, "a corner of the veil
that hides the social state of England in the fifteenth century.
We see houses sacked, judges over-awed, or driven from the
bench, peaceful men hewn down by assassins or plundered by
armed bands, elections controlled by brute force, parliaments
degraded into camps of armed retainers." 3
In the court of the Star Chamber, sometimes referred to as
in its beginning a court of "criminal equity," we see the same
attempt in matters of public offenses to supplement the helpless
machinery of the courts that was made in civil matters. It arose
in the same way. "The King in his council had always asserted
a right in the last resort to enforce justice and peace by dealing
with offenders too strong to be dealt with by his ordinary courts.
Henry systematized this occasional jurisdiction by appointing in
1486 a committee of his council as regular court called the court
of Star Chamber." And this court in its inception, before it lent
itself, by its practice of proceeding without a jury and by the
examination of defendants upon interrogatories without the pres-
ence of accusers, to the designs of oppression, was a court which
Bacon could call "one of the sagest and noblest institutions of
this Kingdom."
There was no thought that the king and his Parliament or
great council in originally granting the petition of suitors because
of failure of the law courts to proceed was exercising other than
ordinary jurisdiction. The Chancellor had always a large ordi-
"Green's "England."
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nary jurisdiction. It was at a later time and for far different
reasons that the extraordinary jurisdiction of the king and the
great council, afterward the Privy or Select Council which grew
out of it, and afterwards the Chancellor, arose.
Nor did in the beginning this exercise by the king of his resi-
dual authority seem to occasion any opposition. But it was at
first exercised by the king and the Great Council.
With the increasing exercise by the Chancellor of his authority
in addition to and above the law, the growth of the equity juris-
prudence becomes inseparably connected with the growth of the
English constitution. For the common law was the bulwark
of English freedom. The principles of the English constitution
are as much a part of it as the oldest custom, and the growth of
the English constitution is the history of a long struggle between
people and prerogative. The development of equity takes on in
some part a political aspect. Many of the protests of the com-
mon law courts against the Chancellor's exercise of power may
have come, as well as from other reasons, from the alarm at
the exercise of this power as exhibiting an increase of the pre-
rogative of the crown. And as the law becomes more and more
le% scripta, its precedents more firmly established, the greater the
alarm must be at any prerogative whatever that might assume
to over-ride it.
Through these troubled waters of politics, then, must the more
just and enlightened principles of the equity jurisdiction pass
before the rude dealings of the courts could be amended. And
even to conterfiporaries their dealings were rude. The jurists of
the continent in the time of Hale thought the common law a
barbarous code and in the language of Pomeroy "it was a bar-
barous code."'
11
The nature and details of the efforts of the common law courts
to resist the growing power of the Chancellor, how far and in
what cases they were connected with politics, how far and wherein
there may have been in them the deep human elements of jealousy
and pride, the picturesque aspects of the contest, in a sense, seems
to be a field open to much further investigation and more adequate
treatment.
Perhaps there were few events that had any real spectacular
interest. Hallam says; "The cases reckoned cognizable in the
Chancery grew silently more and more numerous but with little
overt opposition from the courts of law until the time of Sir
1
4 Vol. i, page 17.
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Edward Coke. That great master of the common law was
inspired not only with the jealousy of this irregular and encroach-
ing jurisdiction which most lawyers seem to have felt but with
a tenaciousness of his own dignity."'15
Here the "overt act" he speaks of was the procuring by Coke
of the indictment of those who had secured the injunction
against the judgment of the King's Bench, which precipitated
the contest before mentioned. But whether there were "overt
acts" or not in such a sense as this, there was a continual struggle
from the beginning and an impression that it was a silent opposi-
tion or passive jealousy, which might perhaps be gained from
the statement of Hallam, does not comport with any other
comment. Nothing certainly could better illustrate the extent
and bitterness of the quarrel than the history of the Statute of
Uses, familiar to every lawyer. Procured by the lawyers to
regain the authority lost to their courts by the innovation of the
doctrine of trusts developed by the Chancery jurisdiction, it
could never have come into existence except as a direct result
of this contest. And Hallam, speaking of this statute as a victory
for the lawyers, says: "But this victory, if I may use such an
expression (since it would have freed them in a most important
point from the Chancellor's control), they threw away by one
of those timid and narrow constructions which had already
turned so much to their prejudice and they permitted trust
estates, by the introduction of a few more words into a con-
veyance, to maintain their ground contra-distinguished from the
legal seizin under the protection and guaranty as before of the
courts of equity.""'
If there was jealousy and bitterness in this long contest, there
seems also to have been occasionally attempts, at least, toward
amicable compromise and reconciliation.
Although the great Chancellor of Henry VIII, Sir Thomas
More, issued but few injunctions, the judges nevertheless com-
plained. He, therefore, caused a docket to be made showing
the list of them and his son-in-law, William Roper, in his quaint
biography of More, then continues: "Which done, he invited
all the judges to dinner with him in the council chamber at West-
minster where after dinner when he had broken with them what
complaints he had heard of his injunctions and moreover showed
them both the number and causes of everyone of them so plainly
"Constitutional History, page 197.
" Eng. Const., page X97.
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that, upon full debating of these matters, they were all enforced
to confess that they in like case could have done no otherwise
themselves, then offered he this unto them, that if the justices
of every court unto whom the reformation of the rigor of the
law by reason of their office most specially appertained, would
upon reasonable considerations by their own discretions as
they were, he thought, in conscience bound, mitigate and reform
the rigor of the law themselves, there should from thenceforth
by him no more injunctions be granted. Whereupon, when they
refused to condescend, then, said he, unto them, 'Forasmuch
as yourselves, my lords, drive me to the necessity for awarding
our injunctions to relieve the people's injury, you cannot hereafter
any more justly blame me'."'-
And Swift says: "From this (defective state of judicial policy)
originated the court of equity, and had courts of law in early
times extended relief and enlarged their jurisdiction according
to the progressive improvements of society with the liberal spirit
and comprehensive views of Lord Mansfield, the existence of a
court of equity as a distinct tribunal had never been necessary.""'
Even so brief a retrospect then, as this, brings home to us
the magnitude of the problem of the development of justice.
Mr. Coudert says: "There is in all modem states to-day a gen-
eral conflict between certainty in the law and concrete justice
in its application to particular cases, in other words, between
the effort to have a general rule, everywhere equally applicable
to all cases at all times, and the effort to reach what may seem
to be concrete right dealing between the parties at bar upon the
particular facts in each case. On the one side is made an appeal
to progress, on the other to precedent."'19 But this is not peculiar
to modern states, nor a problem of to-day. It began when the
first dispute between the first men was settled without recourse
to force by an authority to which they submitted and it will con-
tinue as long as there shall be a conflict of opinion and a
struggle for existence. But will the problem it presents increase
or decrease as the standard of duty among men in their relations
to each other becomes all the time higher and the individual
effort to live out a life that is complete and satisfying becomes
more complex on every hand?
'Page 113.
'Vol. II. page I5.
" "Certainty and Justice," page i.
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What difference is there in the persistent refusal of the court
to abandon or modify the worn out fellow servant doctrine, a
rule absolutely unsupported by modern sentiment, and the flat
refusal of the common law judges six hundred years ago to
abandon a rule that permitted no redress to a party who might
in court have lost his cause through the gross fraud of the other?
The judges themselves denounce it but the supposed homage
to precedent prevents relief from it. There is still here a
repetition of the eternal conflict between precedent and justice.
What is the application of the admonition of Sir Thomas More,
one of the great men of English history, to the judges, or the
meaning of the language of Swift? Let us come nearer home.
In Tingler v. Chamberlain,20 the court decided that the Statute
of Perpetuities forbade one leaving property to A for life and
remainder to his heirs. The decision was based upon the former
case of Leake v. Watson.
Hamersley J. in a courageous dissenting opinion said: "The
rule of 'stare decisis' is wise and salutary, it is based upon the
supreme importance of certainty in the law, but there are
instances where the necessities of truth and justice demand a
modification of former decisions. . . . I must accept my
share of responsibility for a passive concurrence in some cases
where the doctrine of Leake v. Watson has been accepted.
It is an evil to be compelled to acknowledge a mistake in recent
decisions, but it is a greater evil to be compelled to repeat time
after time a statement which we, in common with all the profes-
sion, know is not true and time after time to take from the
near relatives of a testator property which was in truth lawfully
given to them and hand it over to strangers."
Now in our system of government, the courts look to the
legislature to furnish relief from principles outworn. And,
perhaps, precedent can call to its defense the theory that English
equity was in its origin a species of legislation, different from
"judicial legislation" as commonly understood. I do not know
how that may be.
There was no separation of powers at the beginning in
Parliament. Neither in the first General Court of Connecticut
was there any such separation. In it was the whole power,
legislative, executive and judicial. Parliament tried cases in
early times itself with a jury. Why was not the promulgation
of an equitable principle by the council, or afterward by the
071 Conn. 466.
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Chancellor, as its representative, whereby a rule of law became
amended, and a new rule established, the exercise, in fact, of
the power of legislation? If it was the act of the King exercising
his prerogative and later of the King through his Chancellor,
that is the very theory according to which the English Consti-
tution developed-the laws were ordained by the Sovereign with
the consent of the Parliament, and such is the caption of English
statutes to this day.
As against precedent speaking in this wise, I suppose the
answer to be made that this does not touch the real problem
of the development of justice at all, as both the systems of
law and equity have developed it, in a greater or less degree,
by address to methods of interpretation and enlightened senti-
ment, sufficient to make it an adequate expression of what
law really is, a rule or principle which in the words of Mr.
Coudert has "an ideal existence in a dominant public opinion."
It is a slow, sometimes a discouraging process. When rights
of property have become fixed stare decisis must stand. But
precedent must be the servant, not the master of the law. There
come times when responsibility passes beyond the branch of
the legislature. Though the origin of equity and its develop-
ment represent from the beginning to end the spirit of complete
justice in a people, working for expression, yet its own course
has been retarded and stained by all those imperfections of
common human nature which must accompany social develop-
ment of every kind. It was the irony that the Chancery court
should suppose itself through all its history to be the guardian
of the orphan and the refuge of the poor, which roused Dickens
to the bitter satire of Bleak House.
English sentiment against it has been upon occasion so
extreme that it was supposed advisable to terminate its very
existence. The Rump Parliament, in the language of Hallam,
"voted the abolition of the Court of Chancery, a measure pro-
voked by its insufferable delay, its engrossing of almost all
suits and the uncertainty of its decisions." But with all vicissi-
tudes, the equity principles have gone on. It is all a question
of names. Equity has developed into a system of settled prin-
ciples and crystallized into precedents, and is as much an integral
part of the law of the land as the common law.
"The law," says Hobbes, "is the public conscience," and,
"I would fain know to what end there should be any other
court of equity at all either before the Chancery or any other
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person, besides the judges of the civil or Common Pleas." The
question is one that he asked two hundred years ago. The
course of things since makes plain what there is every reason
to believe is to be the answer in the future.
If the difficulties seem large that may be supposed to attend
such a development of our system as will end all distinction
between legal rights and equitable ones, we must remember that
far greater hopes than this for the development of English
jurisprudence have been entertained.
Sir Frederick Pollock has been bold enough, even, to look
forward to a time when there will be no diversity in the com-
mon law as administered here and in England, to a time when
there shall be a vital union between them, to a day when our
own Supreme Court and the House of Lords shall be found
working together, consulting and advising with each other upon
important principles of law, promoting the uniformity of the
entire body of jurisprudence of the English-speaking world.
There cannot be better words than his to express the vision
of such a time: "Some one may ask whether we look to see
these things ourselves, or hope for them in our children's time.
I cannot tell; the movement of ideas will not be measured
beforehand in days or years. Our children and grandchildren
may have to abide its coming, or it may come suddenly when
we are least hopeful. Dreams are not versed in issuable matter,
and have no dates. Only I feel that this one looks forward,
and will be seen as waking light some day. If anyone, being
of little faith or over-curious, must needs ask in what day, I
can answer only in the same fashion. We may know the signs
though we know not when they will come. These things will
be when we look back on our dissensions in the past as brethren
grown up to man's estate and dwelling in unity look back upon
the bickerings of the nursery and the jealousies of the class-
room; when there is no use for the word 'foreigner' between
Cape Wrath and the Rio Grande,. and the federated navies of
the English-speaking nations keep the peace of the ocean under
the Northern lights and under the Southern Cross, from Van-
couver to Sydney and from the Channel to the Gulf of Mexico;
when an indestructible union of even wider grasp and higher
potency than the federal bond of these States has knit our
descendants into an invincible and indestructible concord."
ROBERT L. MUNGER.
ANSONIA, CONN.
